You're right. Of course, Afghanistan is only part of a larger picture, the war against terrorism. "Hopeless and hapless": yes, I will elaborate...
You mentioned Jules Henry's book. I have it in front of me.
First, truth in lending: Jules Henry was a family friend. He taught at Washington U. with my father. Our families spent a vacation together in New Mexico. I remember Jules well; he was always observing. Ruth Benedict and Franz Boas trained him. I never met Margaret Mead, and have no idea what the relationship was between her and Jules.
As you say, J.R., Jules took the tools of anthropology and applied them to America. He wrote that Americans are conditioned to believe, mistakenly, that war is good for the economy. (p. 102) He lambasted the pervasive, "Don't convince 'em. Scare 'em" modus operandi of the powers that be, with these chilling words: "A nation that will respond only to fear cannot govern itself wisely, for it has no destiny but fear ..." (p. 113) Well, the war on terrorism is a classic, vintage case of responding only to fear. Fear as destiny: if that is not "hopeless," what is?
As for "hapless," I don't think it's possible to colonize another nation without colonizing one's own country. The resulting configuration can be summarized in two words: clumsy, naive. Actually, in one word: hapless -- unfortunate, ill-fated.
You asked if I am liberal or conservative. When it comes to the war on terrorism, I am Tocquevillian.
Tocqueville wrote that, in democratic nations, war tends to beome "the biggest and the unique industry." (Democracy in America II, Chapter XXIV, p. 796, Edition La Pleiade. My translation.) A major cause of the drive toward war is as follows: in armies of democratic countries, "everybody can advance, unlike in aristocratic armies where the elite automatically receives the leadership positions as a birthright." In peacetime the military in a democratic nation stagnates, ossifies. Result: "Ambitious people in an army of a democracy ardently desire war … Death opens ceaselessly the ranks, cleans out positions, opens and closes careers." (Chapter XXII, pp. 784-5, 797)
Conversely, Tocqueville says, civilians in a democracy are generally inclined toward peace, which allows them to pursue private interests. Given those two conflicting sectors, "There are two things a people in a democracy will have great difficulty to accomplish: start a war and finish one." (Ibid., p. 787)
I would nuance Tocqueville's insight this way: to the extent that Americans are convinced that war is economically good (Jules Henry's position), it is no longer difficult for their nation to start a war.
Before proceeding, it is necessary to clear up a contradiction: are Americans in favor (Jules Henry) or against (Tocqueville) war? In truth, the American public is ambivalent. A Gallup poll conducted in October 2010 reported that a slight majority, 52%, said the war in Afghanistan was not a mistake. That figure is edging downward. In the same poll, 43% said it was a mistake to send troops to Afghanistan; that figure was only 9% in November 2001, just after American troops arrived. As for Iraq, the Pew Research Center asked at the end of August 2010 if "the U.S. made the right decision or the wrong decision in using military force in Iraq?" 41% said "right," 51% said "wrong." Those figures were 74% and 19% in April 2003, shortly after U.S. troops entered Iraq.
I think it is fair to say that two major tendencies manifest themselves: for the short term, Americans support war. In the long term, they oppose it. Those who seek large public support for a long-term war, then, are working to enact an unworkable project.
Or are they? That project is precisely what is now before the American public. Bergen and Hoffman assert in their report, "Terrorism is not a numbers game," then give an example: the German Baader-Meinhof gang "never numbered more than two dozen or so hard-core terrorists. Yet, they were successful in imposing a reign of terror on that country despite the exertions of its sophisticated police and intelligence and security forces for more than a quarter century." Many terrorists or a few, then, it makes no difference -- the war against terrorists will still go on, we are told. Well, there will always be a few terrorists; therefore … Bergen and Hoffman leave it to you to string the beads.
The biggest supporters of the endless war project being pushed by certain military sectors, turn out to be al-Qaeda and its allies. Bergen and Hoffman note that the terrorists "have embraced a strategy of attrition that is deliberately designed to overwhelm, distract and exhaust its adversaries … Smaller-bore plots and attacks by a wider range of jihadist groups are the likely pattern going forward …" (pp. 24, 26) In short, for all those who seek endless war for whatever purposes, many of which are diametrically opposed, the war on terrorism was made to order.
It is often said that truth is the first casualty of war. Equally important, but less talked about, is the last casualty. Tocqueville concluded that war "without fail will build up immensely, in democratic states, the powers of civil government. War centralizes almost inevitably in that government's hands the control of all men and the employment of all things. If war does not lead suddenly to despotism by violence, war leads to despotism softly, by habits. All men who wish to destroy liberty in a democratic nation should know that the most sure and shortest route to accomplishing their end is by war. That is the first axiom of science." (pp. 787-8)
I have known men who wished to destroy liberty -- hysterics, comparable to bin Laden and Hitler. You meet them, talk with them; you think, "This guy is smart." As the conversation continues, however, it's as if they suddenly come to a fault in the earth; they move down a level and keep right on talking. You think: "My god … For a smart guy, he sure is stupid." Then, as abruptly and unexpectedly as before, he comes to another fault in the earth, bounds up it and continues on his way, just as smart as he was at the start. You wonder, "He has W, X, and Z. So, why doesn't he have Y?" Well, the point is, he doesn't have Y. Never did have it; never will.
Despite a certain unabridged blindness and unabashed stupidity, hysterics perceive things normal people miss. I have the haunting suspicion that Tocqueville put his finger on the most important one. In an endless war, liberty is ended, hapless, doomed.
Attrition, distraction, exhaustion … I think the Bergen/Hoffman report's words will come back to haunt it. And us. What I find particularly unacceptable is that in the endless war scenario moved by the report and seconded by CNN and the media, we are letting al-Qaeda set the agenda. We are, once again, responding only to fear. As Jules noted, that response suits certain purposes; those of most Americans, however, are not among them, certainly in the long term. Look at those poll results again.
You ask for an alternative to an endless war that is constantly reinvigorated reflexively, Pavlovian-style, by "pushing the American public's panic button." That alternative starts by comprehending who most terrorists are: middle class rebels. (The Baader-Meinhof Gang mentioned in the report is a case in point. Baader was a petty criminal, Meinhof, the daughter of a prominent art historian. The incredible violence produced by that combination is found time and again, e.g., the Symbionese Liberation Army in California and the Madrid train bombers. Having no analysis of middle class rebellion, our authorities haven't a clue as to how that combination starts, builds, and seizes control even of its participants.) That is the only way America and its allies can respond from the standpoint of understanding, not of fear. Tragically, for reasons presented in my book, that alternative is unlikely to be seriously considered in the foreseeable future.
And so, we end up where we started in the war on terrorism: no destiny but fear. Hopeless, hapless.
Well, J.R., there you have it. I have succeeded at saying simultaneously too much and too little.
You mentioned Jules Henry's book. I have it in front of me.
First, truth in lending: Jules Henry was a family friend. He taught at Washington U. with my father. Our families spent a vacation together in New Mexico. I remember Jules well; he was always observing. Ruth Benedict and Franz Boas trained him. I never met Margaret Mead, and have no idea what the relationship was between her and Jules.
As you say, J.R., Jules took the tools of anthropology and applied them to America. He wrote that Americans are conditioned to believe, mistakenly, that war is good for the economy. (p. 102) He lambasted the pervasive, "Don't convince 'em. Scare 'em" modus operandi of the powers that be, with these chilling words: "A nation that will respond only to fear cannot govern itself wisely, for it has no destiny but fear ..." (p. 113) Well, the war on terrorism is a classic, vintage case of responding only to fear. Fear as destiny: if that is not "hopeless," what is?
As for "hapless," I don't think it's possible to colonize another nation without colonizing one's own country. The resulting configuration can be summarized in two words: clumsy, naive. Actually, in one word: hapless -- unfortunate, ill-fated.
You asked if I am liberal or conservative. When it comes to the war on terrorism, I am Tocquevillian.
Tocqueville wrote that, in democratic nations, war tends to beome "the biggest and the unique industry." (Democracy in America II, Chapter XXIV, p. 796, Edition La Pleiade. My translation.) A major cause of the drive toward war is as follows: in armies of democratic countries, "everybody can advance, unlike in aristocratic armies where the elite automatically receives the leadership positions as a birthright." In peacetime the military in a democratic nation stagnates, ossifies. Result: "Ambitious people in an army of a democracy ardently desire war … Death opens ceaselessly the ranks, cleans out positions, opens and closes careers." (Chapter XXII, pp. 784-5, 797)
Conversely, Tocqueville says, civilians in a democracy are generally inclined toward peace, which allows them to pursue private interests. Given those two conflicting sectors, "There are two things a people in a democracy will have great difficulty to accomplish: start a war and finish one." (Ibid., p. 787)
I would nuance Tocqueville's insight this way: to the extent that Americans are convinced that war is economically good (Jules Henry's position), it is no longer difficult for their nation to start a war.
Before proceeding, it is necessary to clear up a contradiction: are Americans in favor (Jules Henry) or against (Tocqueville) war? In truth, the American public is ambivalent. A Gallup poll conducted in October 2010 reported that a slight majority, 52%, said the war in Afghanistan was not a mistake. That figure is edging downward. In the same poll, 43% said it was a mistake to send troops to Afghanistan; that figure was only 9% in November 2001, just after American troops arrived. As for Iraq, the Pew Research Center asked at the end of August 2010 if "the U.S. made the right decision or the wrong decision in using military force in Iraq?" 41% said "right," 51% said "wrong." Those figures were 74% and 19% in April 2003, shortly after U.S. troops entered Iraq.
I think it is fair to say that two major tendencies manifest themselves: for the short term, Americans support war. In the long term, they oppose it. Those who seek large public support for a long-term war, then, are working to enact an unworkable project.
Or are they? That project is precisely what is now before the American public. Bergen and Hoffman assert in their report, "Terrorism is not a numbers game," then give an example: the German Baader-Meinhof gang "never numbered more than two dozen or so hard-core terrorists. Yet, they were successful in imposing a reign of terror on that country despite the exertions of its sophisticated police and intelligence and security forces for more than a quarter century." Many terrorists or a few, then, it makes no difference -- the war against terrorists will still go on, we are told. Well, there will always be a few terrorists; therefore … Bergen and Hoffman leave it to you to string the beads.
The biggest supporters of the endless war project being pushed by certain military sectors, turn out to be al-Qaeda and its allies. Bergen and Hoffman note that the terrorists "have embraced a strategy of attrition that is deliberately designed to overwhelm, distract and exhaust its adversaries … Smaller-bore plots and attacks by a wider range of jihadist groups are the likely pattern going forward …" (pp. 24, 26) In short, for all those who seek endless war for whatever purposes, many of which are diametrically opposed, the war on terrorism was made to order.
It is often said that truth is the first casualty of war. Equally important, but less talked about, is the last casualty. Tocqueville concluded that war "without fail will build up immensely, in democratic states, the powers of civil government. War centralizes almost inevitably in that government's hands the control of all men and the employment of all things. If war does not lead suddenly to despotism by violence, war leads to despotism softly, by habits. All men who wish to destroy liberty in a democratic nation should know that the most sure and shortest route to accomplishing their end is by war. That is the first axiom of science." (pp. 787-8)
I have known men who wished to destroy liberty -- hysterics, comparable to bin Laden and Hitler. You meet them, talk with them; you think, "This guy is smart." As the conversation continues, however, it's as if they suddenly come to a fault in the earth; they move down a level and keep right on talking. You think: "My god … For a smart guy, he sure is stupid." Then, as abruptly and unexpectedly as before, he comes to another fault in the earth, bounds up it and continues on his way, just as smart as he was at the start. You wonder, "He has W, X, and Z. So, why doesn't he have Y?" Well, the point is, he doesn't have Y. Never did have it; never will.
Despite a certain unabridged blindness and unabashed stupidity, hysterics perceive things normal people miss. I have the haunting suspicion that Tocqueville put his finger on the most important one. In an endless war, liberty is ended, hapless, doomed.
Attrition, distraction, exhaustion … I think the Bergen/Hoffman report's words will come back to haunt it. And us. What I find particularly unacceptable is that in the endless war scenario moved by the report and seconded by CNN and the media, we are letting al-Qaeda set the agenda. We are, once again, responding only to fear. As Jules noted, that response suits certain purposes; those of most Americans, however, are not among them, certainly in the long term. Look at those poll results again.
You ask for an alternative to an endless war that is constantly reinvigorated reflexively, Pavlovian-style, by "pushing the American public's panic button." That alternative starts by comprehending who most terrorists are: middle class rebels. (The Baader-Meinhof Gang mentioned in the report is a case in point. Baader was a petty criminal, Meinhof, the daughter of a prominent art historian. The incredible violence produced by that combination is found time and again, e.g., the Symbionese Liberation Army in California and the Madrid train bombers. Having no analysis of middle class rebellion, our authorities haven't a clue as to how that combination starts, builds, and seizes control even of its participants.) That is the only way America and its allies can respond from the standpoint of understanding, not of fear. Tragically, for reasons presented in my book, that alternative is unlikely to be seriously considered in the foreseeable future.
And so, we end up where we started in the war on terrorism: no destiny but fear. Hopeless, hapless.
Well, J.R., there you have it. I have succeeded at saying simultaneously too much and too little.