John E., there is a way to locate and identify terrorists without them being aware of it.
That way is no mystery. It does require, however, following certain principles, rules, and procedures.
That way (or methodology) consists of indicators -- traces, if you will. Indicators connect abstract generalities with concrete specifics -- “terrorism” (a somewhat abstract term; you’ll find all sorts of definitions of it on the Internet) with the terrorist, e.g., Mohamed Atta who flew an airplane into the World Trade Center on 9/11/2001.
In the end, it is the terrorist, the guy, who matters. John, you say you want to save lives, not score debating points. Me, too. So, let’s stay oriented on the guy.
To detect him, I need to digress momentarily and give you a clarifying example of the methodology I referred to. It is refined common sense:
Here’s a generality: “The quality of life in Russia is declining.” “Quality”? “Life”? “Decline”? All sorts of things can be said about them; when you put them together, what have you got -- really?
We can bring things down to earth by rephrasing that generality this way: “The quality of life in Russia is declining, as indicated by that nation’s decline in human longevity.” The average human lifespan in Russia is observable and measurable in hard numbers; you can run but you can’t hide from them. Lifespan, incidentally, is widely accepted as an indicator of quality of life.
Note carefully that I did not say that the declining lifespan PROVES that the quality of life in Russia is declining; rather, the former INDICATES the latter. Other indicators of the quality of life exist, such as homicides, marriages, and divorces.
Some indicators are fairly standard. The ones mentioned above appear frequently in quality of life studies. Similarly, you’ll find a number of standard indicators of terrorism. A case in point: making a certain type of bomb requires buying a large amount of a type of fertilizer. If a man not involved in agriculture makes that purchase, his act indicates he may be a terrorist. Of course, what he is doing may be entirely normal and for legitimate purposes. However, the fertilizer purchase indicator is flashing; he is someone to keep under observation.
Terrorists become aware of standard indicators and adjust for them to avoid discovery. That is why the value of those indicators weakens with time. I’m not saying standard indicators should be discarded, only that they should be kept in perspective.
There is a way to work around that weakness: find creative indicators. Artful and secret, they are not modified by terrorists who are no more aware of them than we presently are. And so, unconsciously, the terrorists betray themselves.
As you say, John, human lives are at stake. Bluntly put: if terrorists become aware that something they are doing or saying blows their cover, they will stop doing or saying it. Its value as an indicator evaporates. Which is why I'm not going to develop certain ideas further.
In my book I gave an example of a creative indicator. It can identify a type of criminal.
One evening a top lobbyist for the American Wine Institute invited me to dinner at a fancy restaurant outside Santa Fe, New Mexico. Gazing at the wine list, my attention was called to the sticker price of French Burgundy: $400. I asked him if the wine was worth it. “No wine expert would pay $400 for a bottle of wine in a restaurant,” he solemnly pronounced. That did not mean, however, that the restaurant was charging too much. “If the FBI stationed agents in restaurants like this for a month or two, they would identify all the local drug dealers. They’re the ones who are buying the stuff.” (p. 133)
Note carefully that I did not say that all people who buy expensive wine are drug dealers, nor that all drug dealers buy expensive wine. Buying expensive wine in a restaurant is only an indicator, nothing more. I seriously doubt that drug dealers are aware that a harmless bottle of Burgundy can put a jacket on them, hence the indicator’s usefulness.
As for locating and identifying terrorists, John, you get the point. Powerful, innovative indicators are "out there" in the everyday world, but they must be searched for. They will not walk in and volunteer. As Galileo said, "All truths are easy to understand once they are discovered; the point is to discover them."
CIA, FBI, and other security agents who are reading these words: I hope you will prepare a manual, “Creative Indicators of Terrorism.” The potential rewards are enormous -- not just a game changer but the start of a new game. I also hope you will consider putting certain manifestations of middle class rebellion at the top of the list.
The fight against terrorism is a fight of ingenuity, theirs versus ours. Which is why I look forward to not seeing your manual at the local newsstand.
POSTSCRIPT to the post of November 5 immediately below. According to a CNN report filed the following day, "two U.S. officials said that the street addresses found on the packages were not the current locations of the synagogues and that the packages were addressed to historical figures from the Crusades and the Spanish Inquisition." For insight into al-Qaeda's sense of humor, which is typical of middle class rebellion, see "The Source of Terrorism: Middle Class Rebellion," Chapter 5: The Cult of Contradiction, pp. 165-205.
That way is no mystery. It does require, however, following certain principles, rules, and procedures.
That way (or methodology) consists of indicators -- traces, if you will. Indicators connect abstract generalities with concrete specifics -- “terrorism” (a somewhat abstract term; you’ll find all sorts of definitions of it on the Internet) with the terrorist, e.g., Mohamed Atta who flew an airplane into the World Trade Center on 9/11/2001.
In the end, it is the terrorist, the guy, who matters. John, you say you want to save lives, not score debating points. Me, too. So, let’s stay oriented on the guy.
To detect him, I need to digress momentarily and give you a clarifying example of the methodology I referred to. It is refined common sense:
Here’s a generality: “The quality of life in Russia is declining.” “Quality”? “Life”? “Decline”? All sorts of things can be said about them; when you put them together, what have you got -- really?
We can bring things down to earth by rephrasing that generality this way: “The quality of life in Russia is declining, as indicated by that nation’s decline in human longevity.” The average human lifespan in Russia is observable and measurable in hard numbers; you can run but you can’t hide from them. Lifespan, incidentally, is widely accepted as an indicator of quality of life.
Note carefully that I did not say that the declining lifespan PROVES that the quality of life in Russia is declining; rather, the former INDICATES the latter. Other indicators of the quality of life exist, such as homicides, marriages, and divorces.
Some indicators are fairly standard. The ones mentioned above appear frequently in quality of life studies. Similarly, you’ll find a number of standard indicators of terrorism. A case in point: making a certain type of bomb requires buying a large amount of a type of fertilizer. If a man not involved in agriculture makes that purchase, his act indicates he may be a terrorist. Of course, what he is doing may be entirely normal and for legitimate purposes. However, the fertilizer purchase indicator is flashing; he is someone to keep under observation.
Terrorists become aware of standard indicators and adjust for them to avoid discovery. That is why the value of those indicators weakens with time. I’m not saying standard indicators should be discarded, only that they should be kept in perspective.
There is a way to work around that weakness: find creative indicators. Artful and secret, they are not modified by terrorists who are no more aware of them than we presently are. And so, unconsciously, the terrorists betray themselves.
As you say, John, human lives are at stake. Bluntly put: if terrorists become aware that something they are doing or saying blows their cover, they will stop doing or saying it. Its value as an indicator evaporates. Which is why I'm not going to develop certain ideas further.
In my book I gave an example of a creative indicator. It can identify a type of criminal.
One evening a top lobbyist for the American Wine Institute invited me to dinner at a fancy restaurant outside Santa Fe, New Mexico. Gazing at the wine list, my attention was called to the sticker price of French Burgundy: $400. I asked him if the wine was worth it. “No wine expert would pay $400 for a bottle of wine in a restaurant,” he solemnly pronounced. That did not mean, however, that the restaurant was charging too much. “If the FBI stationed agents in restaurants like this for a month or two, they would identify all the local drug dealers. They’re the ones who are buying the stuff.” (p. 133)
Note carefully that I did not say that all people who buy expensive wine are drug dealers, nor that all drug dealers buy expensive wine. Buying expensive wine in a restaurant is only an indicator, nothing more. I seriously doubt that drug dealers are aware that a harmless bottle of Burgundy can put a jacket on them, hence the indicator’s usefulness.
As for locating and identifying terrorists, John, you get the point. Powerful, innovative indicators are "out there" in the everyday world, but they must be searched for. They will not walk in and volunteer. As Galileo said, "All truths are easy to understand once they are discovered; the point is to discover them."
CIA, FBI, and other security agents who are reading these words: I hope you will prepare a manual, “Creative Indicators of Terrorism.” The potential rewards are enormous -- not just a game changer but the start of a new game. I also hope you will consider putting certain manifestations of middle class rebellion at the top of the list.
The fight against terrorism is a fight of ingenuity, theirs versus ours. Which is why I look forward to not seeing your manual at the local newsstand.
POSTSCRIPT to the post of November 5 immediately below. According to a CNN report filed the following day, "two U.S. officials said that the street addresses found on the packages were not the current locations of the synagogues and that the packages were addressed to historical figures from the Crusades and the Spanish Inquisition." For insight into al-Qaeda's sense of humor, which is typical of middle class rebellion, see "The Source of Terrorism: Middle Class Rebellion," Chapter 5: The Cult of Contradiction, pp. 165-205.