"The Risks Facing Putin and his Inner Circle" is an engaging article on The Cipher Brief. It was written by Steven L. Hall.
Cìpher Brief:
"Steven L. Hall retired from the Central Intelligence Agency in 2015 after 30 years of running and managing intelligence operations in Eurasia and Latin America. Mr. Hall served as a member of the Senior Intelligence Service, the small cadre of officers who are the senior-most leaders of the CIA's Clandestine Service. Most of Mr. Hall's career was spent abroad, overseeing intelligence operations in the countries of the former Soviet Union and the former Warsaw Pact-"
I found Hall´s discussion of Putin and Ukraine singularly enlightening - up to a point. A critical - fatal? - error in single word in his article´s title says it all. A dot needs to be connected.
Just one more step.
* * *
Hall begins with a question asked universally: is Putin sane?
We will return to that issue in an upcoming post. It is an important one. I have not found it adequately discussed anywhere.
Steven Hall:
"At least one of the reasons why we’re seeing some of these unique behaviors from him is that I really do think he is extremely concerned about the siloviki, (translates as ‘people of force’ and is used to describe the political elite that came from the Russian military or security services) or the military elites. I think he’s worried about a coup. He’s worried that what happened to Gorbachev in 1991, could happen to him. And that of course is going to cause him to go a little crazy because he’s got to be wondering about that day and night. It’s also going to cause him to be looking over his shoulder at the siloviki.
A lot of people think the oligarchs will be the ones to overthrow him, or that there will be mass protests and uprising in the streets, but I don’t think that’s the way it’s going to happen. If something happens internally in Russia, it’s going to come from people like Nikolai Patrushev, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. It’s going to come from his intelligence chiefs. That’s what he’s worried about."
The siloviki are the key to change in the Russian presidency. I couldn´t agree more with Hall.
Hall pinpoints that key: not elections or street demonstrations - a coup d’état. Although Westerners discount such a event, Putin knows the siloviki system well and, as Hall notes, fears it. Men like Putin are careful to sleep with a dagger under the pillow.
However, ...
On the one hand; on the other. Hall seems to be ambivalent about the practicality of a coup. Deliberately or not, he minimizes the possibility by highlighting the failed coup against President Gorbachev in 1991:
"The closest historical event we have is the attempt on former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991. Some people are quick to say, “Well, it could never happen because it was the military back then.” And the military was involved with some of the security services, KGB specifically. But more importantly, when you’re comparing the two situations, I think there is a lot more that they have in common than they have as differences.
The primary motivating factor for the siloviki in 1991 to attempt a coup against Gorbachev was that they believed the Soviet Union at the time, was collapsing and that the whole system was going to go down. And they said, “We can’t stand for that. We have to do something to save the Soviet Union.” Fast forward to today, and look at what’s happening to Russia right now, in terms of economic sanctions and in terms of the isolation that it’s experiencing. Consider the ruble, which as U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has said, is worth less than one penny."
I disagree with Hall that the 1991 failed coup was "the closest historical event." For backup I cite two other siloviki coups. Both were successful.
(1) Lavrentiy Beria was Stalin´s secret police chief. Psychopath, sex fiend, Stalin´s purge director, Beria murdered and imprisoned innocent civilians by the thousands. When Stalin died in 1953, Beria was elated. Khrushchev wrote that after Stalin´s stroke, whenever he showed signs of consciousness, Beria dropped to his knees and kissed his hand. When Stalin fell unconscious again, Beria immediately stood and spat.
Wikipedia:
"Beria, as first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and an influential Politburo member, saw himself as Stalin's successor, while wider Politburo members had contrasting thoughts on future leadership. On 26 June 1953, Beria was arrested and held in an undisclosed location near Moscow.
Accounts of his downfall vary considerably. The historical consensus is that Khrushchev prepared an elaborate ambush, convening a meeting of the Presidium on 26 June, where he suddenly launched a scathing attack on Beria, accusing him of being a traitor and spy in the pay of British intelligence. Beria was taken completely by surprise. He asked, "What's going on, Nikita Sergeyevich? Why are you picking fleas in my trousers?"
When Beria finally realized what was happening and plaintively appealed to Malenkov (an old friend) to speak for him, Malenkov silently hung his head and pressed a button on his desk.
This was an arranged signal to Marshal Georgy Zhukov [an immensely popular World War II hero] and a group of armed officers in a nearby room, who burst in and arrested Beria.
As Beria's men were guarding the Kremlin at the time, he was held there in a special cell until nightfall and then smuggled out in the trunk of a car. He was taken first to the Moscow guardhouse and then to the bunker of the headquarters of Moscow Military District. Defence Minister Bulganin ordered the Kantemirovskaya Tank Division and Tamanskaya Motor Rifle Division to move into Moscow to prevent security forces loyal to Beria from rescuing him. Many of Beria's subordinates, proteges and associates were also arrested...
Beria and the others were tried by a "special session" of the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union on 23 December 1953 with no defense counsel and no right of appeal. Beria and all the other defendants were sentenced to death on the day of the trial. The other six defendants...were shot immediately after the trial ended.
Beria was executed separately; he allegedly pleaded on his knees before collapsing to the floor wailing. He was shot through the forehead by General Pavel Batitsky."
(2) Khrushchev in turn was ousted by a coup.
Wikipedia:
"Beginning in March 1964, Supreme Soviet presidium chairman and thus nominal head of state Leonid Brezhnev began plotting Khrushchev's removal with his colleagues. While Brezhnev considered having Khrushchev arrested as he returned from a trip to Scandinavia in June, he instead spent time persuading members of the Central Committee to support the ousting of Khrushchev, remembering how crucial the committee's support had been to Khrushchev in defeating the Anti-Party Group plot. Brezhnev was given ample time for his conspiracy, as Khrushchev was absent from Moscow for a total of five months between January and September 1964.
The conspirators, led by Brezhnev, First Deputy Premier Alexander Shelepin, and KGB chairman Vladimir Semichastny, struck in October 1964, while Khrushchev was on vacation at Pitsunda, Abkhaz ASSR with his friend and Presidium colleague Anastas Mikoyan. On 12 October, Brezhnev called Khrushchev to notify him of a special Presidium meeting to be held the following day, ostensibly on the subject of agriculture. Even though Khrushchev suspected the real reason for the meeting, he flew to Moscow, accompanied by the head of the Georgian KGB, General Aleksi Inauri, but otherwise taking no precautions.
Khrushchev arrived at the VIP hall of Vnukovo Airport; KGB chairman Semichastny waited for him there, flanked by KGB security guards. Semichastny informed Khrushchev of his ouster and told him not to resist. Khrushchev did not resist, and the plotters' coup went off smoothly."
Although the coup leaders gave numerous reasons for ousting Khrushchev, the sine qua non was the loss of national prestige caused by his bungled attempt to install missiles in Cuba in 1962. The siloviki do not tolerate in Russia what it relentlessly fosters elsewhere: weakness, loss of face.
There is no doubt the siloviki have the power to remove Putin. But will they? And under what conditions?
Hall seems to imply that the gradual deterioration and isolation of Russia due to the war in Ukraine will incite the siloviki to overturn Putin. Well, possibly, but not probably. My problem with that scenario: assuming there is one, what, exactly, will be the straw the breaks the camel´s back.
There is another way to assure and hasten a coup. Putin himself naively mentioned it.
In a recent speech he referred to the U.S.´s first strike of atomic weapons in World War II against Japan.
There it is - the proverbial bottom line. The solution.
The straw.
* * *
The United States military has five levels of alert for its armed forces. Known as DEFCON (Defense Readiness Condition), the stages range from the lowest state ("FADE OUT") all the way up to nuclear war ("COCKED PISTOL).
DEFCON 1
COCKED PISTOL
Nuclear war is imminent or has already begun
Maximum readiness. Immediate response.
DEFCON 2
FAST PACE
Next step to nuclear war
Armed forces ready to deploy and engage in less than six hours
DEFCON 3
ROUND HOUSE
Increase in force readiness above that required for normal readiness
Air Force ready to mobilize in 15 minutes
DEFCON 4
DOUBLE TAKE
Increased intelligence watch and strengthened security measures
Above normal readiness
DEFCON 5
FADE OUT
Lowest state of readiness
Normal readiness
The United States should raise its present level of alert to Level 3 or higher. Level 3 ("ROUND HOUSE") existed during the Cuban Missle Crisis of 1962. At Level 3 the Air Force is ready to mobilize in 15 minutes.
The U.S. should make the change without publicly announcing it. Let the siloviki discover it - which they will.
The change in alert level would be a change of - not in - the prevailing situation. It is the dot that needs to be connected.
Collapsing...the whole system was going to go down. The siloviki would wake up one morning to discover they are facing the very real prospect of a Moscow and St. Petersburg that are flat and black and glow in the dark, uninhabitable for 2,000 years. Then and perhaps only then, just as before, will the siloviki act.
We can´t stand for that. We have to do something...
* * *
The way the siloviki see things was revealed to me by a former officer of United States Army Intelligence.
Russian foreign policy toward the West is guided by a super-secret document, "Indicators of Fascism." When the indicators are low in America, the document says Russia can safely forge ahead, push, pounce, grab. No doubt the indicators were near rock bottom when Obama was president; Russia responded to the low indicators by seizing Crimea. As the indicators probably predicted, Obama and the West took no serious action to block Russia. The attached image says all you need to know about the Putin-Obama relationship.
The indicators were low once more in February 2022. Putin amassed troops on the Ukrainian border. He was taking a half-step, waiting to see what NATO would do. Answer: talk, whine - nothing substantial. The war resulted. I will go ahead and say it: Had NATO put Ukraine on a fast-track to membership in early February, the war in Ukraine would not have occurred. For that matter, had the West blocked the seizure of Crimea, the war in Ukraine would not have occurred.
When the indicators of fascism are high, on the other hand, Russia will back off, mark time, even make concessions. There can be no stronger indicator than a Level 3 or higher alert for America´s military.
With that alert, the game changes.
Ever since the Ukraine war began the media have been full of speculation about what Putin is thinking and feeling. Under the change in alert, what goes on inside Putin´s head becomes irrelevant. What the siloviki are thinking and feeling become what matters. Also, the center of gravity of attention instantly shifts from what Putin is thinking to what Biden is thinking.
What you just read is directly contrary to everything you are reading, hearing, The mass media and Washington politicians are filled with worry about not backing Putin into a corner, humiliating him, causing him to lose face, about giving him an off-ramp in the Ukraine war. Exactly the opposite is what is needed. The Ukrainians correctly intuited that reality in exploding the Crimea bridge a day after Putin´s birthday and sending him Marilyn Monroe´s famous "Happy Birthday" tribute to President Kennedy. Mock him. Disgrace him. Humiliate him.
Weaken him.
If Putin wants a nuclear war, there is nothing the U.S. can do to stop him. That is the simple truth. However, the U.S. and its partners, by creating a change of - not in - the prevailing situation, decidedly can induce other hands to block Putin´s hand if and when he reaches for the nuclear button.
We return to the title of Steven Hall´s article, "The Risks Facing Putin and his Inner Circle." The word "and" needs to be replaced by "is." Hall himself intimated it. He walked up to the door, knocked, reached for the handle and then...withdrew his hand, walked away.
What is latent needs to be made manifest. "Indicators of Fascism" explain why displays of weakness, confusion, division, and consternation inevitably court disaster from the Kremlin.
In more ways than one.
* * *
My understanding of the siloviki is not based on history books. I had direct experiences with them.
In 1995, I was living in Moscow near Aviamotornaya metro station with a Russian family while studying Russian at the Moscow State Linguistic Institute. Unlike Steven Hall, I had no diplomatic passport; no high-level safety net. I was literally out on the street on my own every day.
Boris Yeltsin was in power. The Institute administration was packed with former KGB - secret police - officers. In the first week or two I had an urgent problem that needed a solution. I made an appointment with the head man. Nobody I knew had done it - the students were afraid of him; how former the former secret police were was a matter of conjecture.
I will never forget his face when I entered his office. I saw a granite statue. A statue does not shake hands. A statute does not ask what the problem is. He simply stared at me.
We foreign students were dependent on travelers checks for our daily living. Only one bank accepted them. I informed him that for some reason the bank suddenly no longer did so. I was fully expecting a bureaucratic delay, runaround, denial, passing the buck.
He turned sideways to me, picked up the phone. He mumbled a few words. A reply instantly shot back. He hung up.
"The bank will now accept travelers’ checks." He said it expressionlessly. No smile, no triumphant tone; no nothing.
A potential disaster was solved in less than 10 seconds. I thanked him. The granite facade never cracked, wrinkled. No nod, zero. Chitchat was out of the question.
I had other meetings with him and other administrators. It was always the same thing. Side mumbles on the phone; zero emotion 10 seconds maximum...problem solved.
The U.S. of course also has old boy networks. However, they are in no way comparable to what I personally experienced in Moscow.
Lightning fast. Dead on.
#stevenhall #ukrainewar #theciberbrief #defcon #lavrentiyberia #siloviki #nikitakhrushchev #putin